Is the soul composed of matter and form? Thomas Aquinas asks this question in Summa Theologica, Ia, q.75, a.5.
See Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Doctoris Angelici, ordinis praedicatorum opera omnia
, 1:28.
2. Thomas is not alone in this position. Many authors today continue to advocate the Thomist view, both in general and in specific. See, e.g will show, these thinkers, by and large, understand created to entail hylomorphic. Hence, even "immaterial" creatures-be they angels or souls-must be matter/form composites. Unlike Aquinas, who understands angels and the soul to be form without matter, and thus to be truly "immaterial," a great many Eastern fathers understand "immaterial" to be a relative term which connotes that spiritual creatures are composed of matter more subtle than flesh. Spiritual creatures are thus immaterial relative to fleshly bodies, but relative to God, they are material.
In what follows, I defend this hylomorphic understanding of created spirits (henceforth "pneumatic hylomorphism," or PH).
3 More specifically, I will argue that both the human soul and angels (a) have essential form and matter; (b) that the former is the locus of their respective essential properties, while the latter is the locus of their respective potentialities, accidents, and mutations; and (c) that the principle of unity between essential form and matter is the particular in which both form and matter exist. My defense is both constructive and historical. On the constructive side, I argue that PH is the most cogent model of Christian substance dualism and angelology, given Christian claims concerning the intermediate state and the distinction between elect and fallen angels. On the historical side, I argue that PH plays a significant role in a number of Trinitarian and Christological disputes of the first millennium, and thus argue that a historically robust commitment to the Nicene faith entails an affirmation of PH. A key dimension of this historical case is my contention that Christianity is not philosophically neutral, but has historically proved to have metaphysical commitments that are central to its confessional commitments.
The structure of this essay is as follows. In section 1, I provide a historical sketch of the movement from patristic PH to Western medieval alternatives. This sketch provides the backdrop for the argument of this essay. In section 2, I assess the analytic cogency of three models that dominate medieval anthropology and angelology within this sketch. I argue that PH, as argued by the Eastern fathers, unites the strengths of two of these models and avoids the pitfalls of the third, thus offering the most cogent Christian anthropology and angelology of the positions discussed. In section 3, I bring to the fore confessional considerations that add weight to the case for PH. I argue that PH plays an important role in the soteriology of the pro-Nicenes and in the Nicene understanding of the difference between eternal generation of the Son of God and the making of creatures. Therefore, I argue that a truly historical affirmation of Nicene Trinitarianism and Chalcedonian Christology entails an affirmation of PH. In section 4, I consider the contemporary anthropological alternatives of materialism and emergentism. I argue that these alternative anthropologies face two serious challenges. The first is demonstrating in what sense they are "Christian" alternatives, given what we find in section 3. The second is showing how these alternatives advance the discussion beyond what is already found in ancient and medieval Christian thought. In the end, I conclude that the contemporary anthropological alternatives do not advance the discussion beyond what is available to us in ancient and medieval philosophical theology, and that PH thus remains the most cogent and confessionally sound option.
Before beginning, I should offer two clarifications concerning my use of the word "matter" throughout this essay. First, when speaking of matter, I do not mean an object that has mass and includes atoms and other particles. I mean, instead, what Aristotle calls prime matter. 4 That is to say, I mean a substratum of pure potentiality that has no properties of its own, but is only able to receive those properties God places in it when making a particular substance. Matter in this sense cannot be identified with any particular object, for even particles and elements have actual properties-namely, the nature (or substantial form) of the given particle or element and its accidents, such as location or quantitative size. 5 To understand the historical discussion of PH, we must recognize the difference between the contemporary concept of matter and the ancient concept of prime matter. Second, though I will more often than not use matter in the sense of prime matter, the Church fathers and later medieval scholastics will at times distinguish the material (that is, the fleshly and concrete) from the immaterial (that is, the spiritual and ethereal), even when granting that both have prime matter. To avoid confusion on this point, I will reserve the word "matter" for prime matter and reserve the term "gross matter" for that which is fleshly and concrete, as opposed to spiritual and ethereal. 
Pneumatic Hylomorphism: A Historical Précis
Current scholarship offers surprisingly little on PH, 7 but the position has a robust history in both Greek philosophy and Christian theology. We will here focus on the latter. 8 Numerous patristic figures, including Tatian, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius-and it seems Clement of Alexandria, Justin Martyr, and Dionysius of Alexandria as well-assert the corporeality of angels. 9 In these early Christian writings, the belief in angelic corporeality seems to underwrite angelic mutation, such as growth or diminishment in goodness, and angelic sexuality, as per the reading of the Nephilim as offspring of fallen angels.
10 Yet, the more fundamental assumption of these early Christian writers is that God alone is immutable . Clement affirms that God alone is essentially good; hence all creatures undergo moral mutation, a point that is used by later fathers to argue the corporeality of spirits. See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 2.3; 7.3; [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . And all three figures understand created to entail mutative, and associate mutability with materiality/corporeality. See Justin Martyr, Dialogi cum Tryphone judaeo, 5-6 (PG 6:485C-491A); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 1.11; Dionysius of Alexandria, "Against Sabellius," in Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio evangelica, .
10. Gen. 6:4; Tatian, Oratio adversus Graecos, 4; [12] [13] [14] ; Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, 4.37.2-6 (PG 7:1100-03); Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, 1.4 (PG 6:1029a); Justin Martyr, Apologia secunda, 5 (PG 6:452-3); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 2.3; 7.3; [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] (atreptos or analloiōtos); 11 thus, that which is not God is mutable (treptos or alloiōtos).
12 Because many early Christians associate mutation with matter or corporeality, 13 the movement from the mutability of spirits to the corporeality of spirits follows naturally.
Affirmation of PH is also reflected in the anthropology of these early figures. Several early Christian writers read the story of the rich man and Lazarus as proof that the human soul is corporeal. According to Irenaeus, the story demonstrates that the soul has the same shape as the human body since it is recognizable to those who see it.
14 Tertullian reaches the same conclusion from the rich man's references to his disenfleshed tongue and to Abraham's disenfleshed finger.
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A more sophisticated articulation of PH emerges in Origen and his followers. Origen identifies matter as the basis for number and diversity and the locus of both potency and accidents. 16 In light of such claims, we could argue inductively that Origen affirms PH, since he understands angels to be created; to include number and diversity; 17 to have accidents (such as goodness, which is essential to God alone); and to mutate.
18 Since number, difference, potency, and accidents all find their home in matter, spirit creatures, having all four, must be hylomorphic. However, we need not speculate, since Origen is clear that the Holy Trinity alone is truly incorporeal.
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Now, Origen presumes that because God is incorporeal, the more spiritual (or Godlike) a creature is, the more subtle its matter, while the less spiritual (or Godlike) a creature is, the more fleshly it is. This is what fuels Origen's claim that all souls are created in a disembodied state, and fol-11. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 1.24; 2.16; 7.3 (PG 8:909C; 9:421B); Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis, 22.5 (PG 6:937C); Justin Martyr, Quaestiones et responsiones ad orthodoxos, 36 (PG 6:1281d orthodoxos, 36 (PG 6: -1284a Methodius, Convivium decem virginum, 6.1 (PG 13.111d-114c lowing their moral self-determination, they retreat from God to a body appropriate to their self-determination. Corrupted souls (such as demons and men) receive fleshly bodies, while virtuous souls (such as the elect angels) remain highly ethereal. 20 Yet, through moral transformation, souls trapped in gross matter may ascend into the ranks of ethereal angels. 21 In short, the moral movement of the creature toward or away from God brings with it a material change toward (ethereal) or away from (corporeal) God. And this claim echoes in later Origenists. 22 Origen's more idiosyncratic claims, such as the preexistence of souls and the soul's ability to ascend to the angels or descend to the beasts, 23 would be deemed heretical at the fifth ecumenical council (AD 680/681). 24 Of course, the most problematic of Origen's idiosyncrasies is his doctrine of apokatastasis, according to which the goal of spiritual growth is to transcend matter altogether and be subsumed into God-a goal the Origenists believed would be successfully wrought in all, including the Devil. 25 The eventual rejection of Origenism should not be taken to indicate that PH would fall out of favor, however. Quite the contrary, we find that PH plays a positive role in a number of major controversies after Origen on up through the seventh century and beyond, the most notable being the Arian disputes.
Amid the Arian controversies, PH plays a crucial role in highlighting the differences between God and creatures, and thus in drawing out the implications and inadequacies of Arian Christology. One of the central differences that Athanasius highlights (already noted by earlier writers) is that God is 20. Ibid., 1.6.2; 1.6.4; 1.7.4; 1.7.5; 1.8.4; 2.2 .
21. Ibid., 1.8.4 (PG 11:179a-182ba). 22. See, e.g., Evagrius Ponticus, Scholion 2 to Ps. 134:6; and Scholion 275 to Prov. 24:22. 23. Jerome, Epistolae, 124 (PG 22:1059-72) . The claim that flesh may undergo change, becoming more or less spiritual, was not considered heretical in itself. To the contrary, many presumed that Christ's own body underwent transformation throughout his life until being glorified at the cross and raised incorruptible at the resurrection, and this same transformation is what we must undergo to inherit the Kingdom of Heaven. See, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Adversus Apollinarem ad Theophilum (PG 45:1269b (PG 45: -1278c immutable, but all creatures mutate. 26 Gross matter perpetually changes in color, position, and so on, and rationale creatures, including angels, undergo moral mutations. 27 The implication for Arius is that if the Son is created, then the Son is mutable. For, Athanasius argues, if the Son came into existence by moving from nonbeing into being, then this first movement is a mutation, and the mutable Son is of a nature unlike that the immutable God. 28 Athanasius's claim on this point reflects the type of metaphysic in the Aristotelians and Neoplatonists who, contra the Eleatic dichotomy between actuality and nothingness, speak of actuality, potentiality, and nothingness. Potentiality, or potency, is meant to account for that which is more than nothing but less than actual. For example, my skin's potency to be red is ontologically more than nothing, but it is ontologically less than the actual redness that occurs when my skin is burnt. Relative to nothing potency is being, but only in a qualified sense because relative to actuality it is nonbeing.
29 Potentiality is meant to account for the phenomenon of "change," or rather the movements in and out of being (My skin becomes red or My skin ceases to be red) and the gradations of being present in such movements (the redness of my skin at t 2 is greater than its redness at t 1 but less than its redness at t 3 ), both of which seem impossible under the strict Eleatic dichotomy of sheer nothingness and sheer actuality. 30 On this view, such ontological movements and gradations are part of creaturely generation. Creatures are conceived in a seedling state in which the abstract nature (or essential form) is coupled with prime matter (pure potency), and matter then moves from relative nonbeing into being, manifesting the essential properties of that nature (for example, bipedal, rational, and so forth), along with varying accidental properties (for example, color, size, and so forth). As for the source of these movements, it is presumed they cannot be located in matter (since it is pure potentiality) nor in the nature itself (since it does not exist necessarily, and thus has no inertia toward existence). Thus, these movements must be affected from without by God, acting as an efficient cause. Athanasius's sympathies for this metaphysic is reflected in the fact that he speaks of man being created out of nothing (oukh ontes), but when speaking of his mutative movement into [58] [59] [60] [61] Aristotle, Metaphysica, being, he speaks of man's natural state of nonbeing (mē einai) from which he first moved into being and to which he may retreat.
31
If this metaphysic is what Athanasius is presuming, then the affirmation that both the soul and angels move from nonbeing into being (and may move back) amounts to an affirmation that both are hylomorphic. Such a reading finds confirmation in at least three points in Athanasius's corpus: (i) Athanasius claims that God alone is truly incorporeal (asōmatos); 32 (ii) Athanasius ascribes corporeality to angels in his biography of St. Antony; 33 and (iii) Arius feels compelled to state that he does not believe that the Son derives subsistence from matter, indicating that Arius recognized the hylomorphic features of Athanasius's case against his Christology.
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Athanasius's metaphysical objection to Arianism is not unique, but echoes in other opponents of Arianism in his day and ultimately in the 325 Nicene Creed, which anathematizes all talk of mutability (treptos/alloiōtos) in reference to the Son. 35 Moreover, these objections persist among the fathers in the semi-Arian disputes to follow, reflected specifically, though not exclusively, 36 in the writings of the Cappadocians. Basil of Caesarea, writing in reaction to the news that the bishop who had baptized him had subscribed to the Arian creed of Arminum, echoes the same metaphysic. Basil ascribes corporeality to all of creation, suggesting that God is the Creator of bodies. 37 Basil links number with body, and also makes clear that bodiliness entails materiality: "every number indicates those things which have received a material [enulon] and circumscribed nature."
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Lest we take Basil to be speaking of gross matter, he makes plain that angels are included in the ranks of corporeal bodies: "Similarly we say one angel in number, but not one by nature nor yet simple, for we conceive of the hypostasis of the angel as essence with sanctification [meth hagiasmou]." 39 The reference to angels being essence with holiness is an echo of previous fathers who understand moral properties to be accidental to creatures, and the remark is meant to disprove that even angels are simple, since they have essence and accidents. 40 Basil is not unique in denying the simplicity of angels or of the soul. Bonaventure, as we will see, admits that the simplicity of spirit creatures is a relative simplicity. See Bonaventure, corporeal, and his goodness is accidental. 41 These same arguments appear in Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzen, who likewise ascribe mutation, circumscription, and moral accidents to creatures (spirit or otherwise). 42 Moreover, both Gregorys echo Athanasius's distinction between the eternal generation of the Son, which is without matter, mutation, or sequence, and the mutative generation of creatures from nonbeing into being.
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Suffice it to say the metaphysical assumptions of PH persist in the Eastern fathers beyond the Cappadocians. Hence, John of Damascus, writing his exposition of the consensus patrum in the eighth century, articulates this very same metaphysic. Though he identifies angels as having a "bodiless nature" (physis asōmatos) and as "immaterial fire" (pur aulos), 44 John is clear that these are relative terms, for "in comparison with God, who alone is incorporeal, everything proves to be gross [pakhu] and material [hylikon] ."
45 As for the soul itself, John insists that the soul and the body are formed at the same time (contra the preexistent soul), but he insists that the soul and the body each have their own discrete nature, arguing that this is proved by the survival of the soul in the intermediate state.
46 He thus rejects the Aristotelian notion that the soul is the form of the body, and affirms instead that the soul is itself a particular that is hylikos in comparison with God and has its own nature.
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Given the dominance of PH in early patristic writers in general and in the Eastern fathers in particular, it is not surprising that we continue to find references to the corporeal nature of spirits in Eastern writers after the eighth century. 48 As for the West, though we have seen examples of Latin ante-Nicene 868b; , where John ascribes circumscription and moral mutation to angels.
46. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, 2.12 (PG 94:918d-930b). Cf. Gregory of Nazianzen, Orationes, 7.21-24 .
47. A Thomist, who affirms Aristotle's view and understands the unity of body and soul to be rooted in the fact that the soul is the form of the body, may want to press John on what unites the discrete natures of soul and body. Suffice it to say that John understands the principle of unity to be not the hylomorphic relationship itself, but to be the hypostasis in which multiple natures are united. See John of Damascus, Dialectica, 50 From this one could argue that neither angels nor souls can be pure form. In addition, Augustine entertains the corporeality of angels in some texts, 51 and shows interest in Tertullian's corporeal understanding of the soul. 52 Yet, other aspects of Augustine's corpus point in a different direction, such as his claim that we will someday see the archetypal Ideas, 53 which indicates an extreme realist isolation of true Form from matter. 54 Depending on how one resolves this tension in Augustine's thought, the results may help or hurt the case for Augustinian PH. What we do not find in Augustine, however, is recognition of the confessional importance of PH to Eastern writers. I think it is safe to say this is not a matter of opposition to PH's confessional importance but a matter of ignorance. For Augustine admits in De Trinitate that he is certain that the answer to any question on the Trinity can be found in the Greek writers, but most in the West, himself included, do not read Greek well enough to gather much from their writings. 55 Augustine's less-confessional treatment of PH is reflected in the Western discussion in the Middle Ages. Three competing views emerge in Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus, respectively.
56 Bonaventure takes a positive stance toward PH. He notes that both angels and the human soul subsist, act, and suffer independent of gross matter-this being proved by the intermediate state. He therefore concludes that created spirits must include a formal and a material principle. 57 a hylomorphic understanding of particularity in which the individuation of form in matter is the basis of particularity, and he presumes that the material substrate is also the basis for becoming. His case is that form alone is neither particular nor includes becoming, but souls and angels are particulars that include becoming. Hence, they must be both matter and form. The difference between corporeal and incorporeal, says Bonaventure, is that the corporeal includes matter, form, and properties of quantity and contrariety (quantitatis et contrarietatis), while spiritual substances include only matter and form. 58 Thomas Aquinas admits that spirit creatures include both potency and actuality, and thus suggests that if this is all that one means by matter and form, there can be no dispute. But, for Aquinas, this concession is only analogous, as he does not understand the potentiality of spirits to be prime matter. 59 Instead, Aquinas affirms Aristotle's view that the soul is the substantial form of the human person, while the body is the matter informed by this nature. 60 Though the soul is conjoined with matter (gross and prime) in its union with body, the soul itself is incorporeal. 61 Yet, angels, being incorporeal, are neither material nor conjoined with matter (prime or gross), but are form only. Aquinas, like Bonaventure, presumes a hylomorphic understanding of particularity, and thus grants that without a material substrate, division and number are impossible. The implication for his angelology is that angels cannot be multiple particulars of a common nature. Instead, each angel must be a species unto itself: Gabriel is the nature of Gabriel. 62 What angels share is not a common nature, but a common genus. 63 Scotus offers a via media between Bonaventure and Aquinas. He affirms Bonaventure's concern that form is a universal, not a particular. Though Aquinas may have a solution to the angelic problem, Scotus does not think Aquinas can avoid the problem of the intermediate state. To wit: if the soul is the form, human, and the body is the material substrate that yields a particular human, then the form should no longer be a particular when separated from the body. Rather, the particular human should cease to exist unless the soul has some matter in it. 64 Scotus's dispute is not with Bonaventure's rationale, but with his understanding of particularity. Unlike Bonaventure and Aquinas who link particularity with matter, Scotus identifies particularity as a property unto itself. This property, haecceitas, is the discrete property of being this. 65 Scotus argues that while the soul has no matter and thus no accidents, every soul that subsists, subsists as a particular soul. Hence, the soul remains this soul, even when separated from matter.
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The medieval dispute does not yield a Western consensus on PH, but it does illustrate the different postures toward PH in East and West. In the East, the metaphysics of PH are both dominant and confessionally significant, while in the West the topic is a matter of metaphysical interest, but its confessional significance goes largely unrecognized.
Pneumatic Hylomorphism: An Analytic Defense
In this section, I will consider the three positions on the soul and angelology represented in Western medieval theology with a view defending PH. Before beginning my assessment, however, I think it is necessary to place these positions on the spectrum of medieval realism.
67 Though I am certain that this placement will be review for many readers, it will help clarify my case.
The poles of this spectrum are nominalism and extreme realism. Nominalism denies that universals-be they human, dog, or horse-exist outside of the mind. Human, and all such general nouns, are abstractions of the intellect. The mind abstracts the commonalities it finds in Peter, James, and John, and this abstraction is what it names human-hence the title "nominalism" from the Latin for "name," nomen. Yet, for the nominalist, there is no referent for this general noun outside of the mind; only particulars exist in reality. By contrast, extreme realism affirms not only that universals exist outside of the mind (all realists affirm this), but holds that universals exist independent of particulars. The common portrait of Plato's extreme realism, for example, is that these universals comprise a world of archetypes all its own. The soul has innate knowledge (or memories) of these archetypes because it transmigrates from the world of the archetypes (or Forms) to our world of material copies, and when the soul encounters a particular something in our world, the soul associates the copy with its archetype: John (copy) is human (archetype).
The three positions we will look at avoid both nominalism and extreme realism. They fall, instead, under the heading of moderate realism. That is to say, they affirm that universals exist in reality outside of the mind, but they deny that universals exist independent of particulars. For the moderate realist, a general noun (for example, human) does not refer to an archetype with independent existence. The general noun refers to the nature that is immanent in the particular. We might think of the moderate realist position as analogous to the relationship between a computer and a computer program. The computer programmer (representative of God) has in his mind the abstract idea of a game, Adventure to Mars, that is nowhere actual. The programmer then programs Adventure to Mars (substantial form) into three different computers (matter). Adventure to Mars is now actual on Computers 1, 2, and 3. On the level of programming data (essential properties), the game is identical on all three computers. But the three instances of Adventure to Mars are not identical, all things considered. For these essential properties are now combined with material accidents: Each computer occupies a different location; each game is performing a different function; the respective screens yield color variations; and so on. This is how the moderate realist understands the matter/form relationship in creatures. Peter, James, and John share a common form, nature, or essence (human), and on that level they are identical. Yet, Peter, James, and John are not identical, all things considered. For the form, human, is combined with distinct material accidents in the respective subjects: Peter, James, and John occupy different locations, different sizes, different colors, and so on. Now, one dispute among medieval moderate realists, noted in the previous section, concerns the locus of particularity. 68 One position holds that particularity is the result of the coupling of form and matter. That is to say, the reason Peter and James can subsist as two particulars of a common nature is because form is coupled with matter, which makes material division and accidental distinction possible-Peter is here; John is there; Peter is this size; John is that size; and so forth. This hylomorphic view of identity is what is presumed by Aquinas and Bonaventure. Scotus, by contrast, argues that if particularity is simply the result of material accidents, it would seem that the given particular could be duplicated if one could duplicate the given set of essential and accidental properties. Yet, Scotus takes it as given that identity does not function in this way. He thus posits what he calls haecceitas, or the property of being this. According to Scotus, this is the one discrete property that any given subject has, and this property necessarily excludes the property of being not-this. Antonie Vos summarizes Scotus's insight thusly:
[I]t is his point that if we can talk of one item of something real, we have to accept that such a unity enjoys being (entitas). However, we exclusively meet being one in an individual. An individual is as such individual, it is essentially individual. It cannot be subdivided into more identical individuals. For Scotus, the notions of being individual, numerical unity, or countability and singularity are equivalent. What does he mean by them? Articulated unity (unitas determinata) is at stake. He calls it by a fine metaphor: signed unity. This unity-the unity of being this-is signed unity. Being individual and being subdivided into more subjects are incompossible, but what accounts for this in(com)possibility? This thing cannot be not-this thing; it is signed (signatum) by its singularity.
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The implication of this view is that, though every universal that constitutes an essential or accidental property can be shared with other particulars, what can never be shared is the identity of the particular that has these properties, that is to say its haecceitas, the thisness of the thing.
Keeping these competing understandings of particularity before us and drawing on the computer analogy used above, we can illuminate Scotus's objection to Aquinas's anthropology. According to Aquinas, the human soul is the immanent form (human) of the hylomorphic particular (John). On a Thomist reading of the computer analogy, the soul would be Adventure to Mars immanent in Computer 1. 70 The problem this view faces is that human souls are separated from the body in the intermediate state but remain particular. Yet, let us say that Computer 1 dies and Adventure to Mars is wiped clean from the hard drive. Would the instance of Adventure to Mars on Computer 1 continue to exist? Clearly not. And so it should be in Thomas's anthropology. If matter is what makes particularity possible and the fleshly body is the only matter present in the subject, then the soul cannot subsist as a particular when separated from the body. Rather, the separation of form from matter should mark the end of the subject. This is precisely why Bonaventure asserts, and Scotus agrees, that on the hylomorphic view of particularity, the soul itself must be hylomorphic. By way of analogy, the separation of soul from body must be akin to the removal of the hard drive in which Adventure to Mars is programmed; it cannot be the removal of Adventure to Mars from the computer altogether.
69. Vos, John Duns Scotus, 11.4.5 (412). Scotus's theory of particularity is expounded in Lectura, 2.3 and Ordinato, 2.3.
70. E.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q.75, a.4. Now, one might object to the above analogy because we cannot in fact remove Adventure to Mars from the hard drive of Computer 1 and have it endure independent of the computer; we can only erase it from Computer 1. However, it is not clear to me that this is a point at which the analogy fails. Moderate realism is distinguished from extreme realism on the very basis that the former does not believe that universals can exist independent of particulars. Thus, we may rightly ask whether it makes sense for the moderate realist to speak of form continuing to exist independent of the matter. 71 Yet, let us entertain for a moment the possibility that God could somehow preserve an immanent form independent of matter in which it was first immanent. Would this fix the problem? I do not think it would. Even if immanent form can continue to exist when no longer immanent, the problem remains that form is a universal, not a particular. If form is all that remains when the soul departs, we still lack a basis for particularity. To remove Raleigh SaintClair's soul (form) from Raleigh Saint-Clair's body (matter) should leave us with the substantial form human, not with a disembodied Raleigh SaintClair. And as for Raleigh himself, he should cease to exist, since the removal of form from matter marks the end of this hylomorphic subject.
Outside of PH, I see three possible solutions to this problem. The first is to suggest that the immanent form is in some sense particular in the enduring subject. Aristotle scholars, for example, dispute whether he distinguishes the particular (for example, Jane) from the individual (for example, human), the latter being the nature or essence that is in some way made individual when immanent in the particular. 72 There are hints of this distinction in Aquinas, 73 and it echoes in contemporary philosophers with Thomist leanings who draw a distinction between, say, Joe's and Jim's respective humanity.
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I, for one, cannot see how this solution avoids the basic category error of labeling a universal a particular. What makes a universal a universal and not a particular is that it is common to multiple particulars. This is why we find in the Cappadocian fathers, for example, objection to talk of "three hu-71. Although Thomas Aquinas is often labeled a moderate realist, the fact that he understands angels and (in the intermediate state) the soul to be form that exists independent of matter, I question this label. It seems to me that his advocacy of such formal independence requires either extreme realism or nominalism, according to which form, considered independent of the mind, is not in fact a universal but a particular.
72 mans." For human is the common nature or essence, and this is one. It is the particulars in which this nature adheres that are many: They are three human (singular) persons (plural) . 75 For my part, I do not see how one can identify Peter's humanity as unique and distinct from Paul's humanity without denying universals in general and the notion of common natures in specific.
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The second avenue of reply is to concede the rationale of PH, but retreat to soul sleep. That is, rather than suggesting that the soul (form) is separated from the body (matter), one could assert that the particular continues to endure insofar as the form lies dormant in the eroding material until both are reanimated. Employing our computer analogy, this would be akin to suggesting that, rather than Adventure to Mars being erased from the hard drive, the computer shuts down temporarily. The particular copy of Adventure to Mars continues to exist on the hard drive of Computer 1, but it lies dormant until the computer is reawakened. The hylomorphic particular thus endures, but in an unconscious state.
One major problem facing this solution concerns the erosion of the body itself. For the analogy to hold, Computer 1 must not simply sleep but disintegrate. In what sense can Adventure to Mars be said to lie dormant in the hard drive of Computer 1 if the hard drive and Computer 1 is reduced to dust? It seems to me that this solution attempts to have it both ways. It suggests that the particular is preserved because the subject (though dormant) endures in the body; yet it is empirically evident that a great many bodies do not endure.
The remaining solution is the haecceitas theory of Scotus. Employing this understanding of particularity, essential and accidental properties are had by the particular, but the particular is none of these properties nor is the particular the sum of these properties. A proponent of haecceitas could argue, as Scotus does, that the soul is form without matter, but avoid the pitfall of suggesting that the form is a particular. Rather, because the particular is that which subsists and in which properties adhere, the essential properties of the soul are had by the particular, even when no material accidents are present. The soul can therefore separate from the body without losing its particularity because the particularity of the soul is distinct from both the essential properties of soul and the material accidents of body.
On the one hand, I believe Scotus's view of particularity is quite right. In fact, I believe this is approximately the view of particularity in the Nicene use of "hypostasis." As John of Damascus explains, "It is only the hypostases, the individuals, that is, that subsist of themselves, and in them are found both the substance and the essential differences, the species and 75. Gregory of Nyssa, Quod non Sint tres Dii ad Ablabium (PG 45:115a-124c); Basil of Caesarea, Epistulae, ; Gregory of Nazianzen, Orationes, 29, .
76. I employ this same line of reply to Leftow's talk of tropes (by which he means individuations of attributes) in "On 'Not Three Gods'-Again," 342. the accidents." 77 Yet, conceding that a particular need not have accidentsa concession vindicated by the particulars of the Trinity-is different from conceding that a particular human soul, apart from the body, does not have accidents. In other words, one could affirm Scotus's theory of particularity and affirm that particular spirit creatures are hylomorphic. This is where I believe Scotus's solution, though basically correct in its theory of particularity, misses the more central concern of PH represented in pro-Nicene patristic literature.
The more central concern I have in mind is that spirit creatures, both angels and souls, include accidents and becoming in Christian theology. I see this in at least three areas of Christian doctrine. First, the very concept of the intermediate state entails that the disembodied soul retains location and situation. Notice that Christ identifies Hades as a place (topos) in Luke 16:28. Likewise, angels are said to be in a certain place and to move from one location to another (for example, Job 1:6-7; . This is why the Church fathers identify all creatures, angels included, as having a circumscribed nature. 78 Now, one might argue that the soul and angels can be circumscribed and have limited location and situation without having material accidents. This is not clear to me, but even if granted, there is a second consideration. Scripture ascribes to the human soul, if not angels as well, intrinsic mutations of thought. The disenfleshed soul prays, recalls past ills, and pleads for justice (for example, Luke 16:19-31; Rev. 6:9-11). Such shifting thoughts are neither passive potencies (such as the potency to have red pass before the eye) nor extrinsic accidents (such as location). They are innate potencies that the soul moves from potency to act. Such a movement is a matter of becoming in which the potency moves from relative nonbeing into being, and this type of movement constitutes an intrinsic mutation. Such mutations beckon the question: What is mutating in the soul? Surely this mutation cannot be a change in essential form. For, if it were, the mutation would constitute a change of species-the soul mutates from one type of thing (human soul) to another type of thing (not-human soul). Alternatively, one could argue that the particular is what mutates. But I do not see how the particular can be the principle of mutation, since the very notion of particularity aims at identifying a subject that endures throughout mutations. If the particular is what changes, then it would seem the change is from one particular (this) to 77 another (not-this), and there is no enduring subject. Thus, there must be some principle of potentiality that is the locus of these movements from nonbeing to being and back, and such a principle is what is called prime matter.
The only way that I see to avoid this conclusion is to invoke something like Aristotle's notion of energeia and its application to the doctrine of God in Eastern theology. Aristotle draws a distinction between the innate power of a given nature and the operation of this power. 79 In the Eastern Church fathers, this distinction is used to explain (among other things) how the divine nature (ousia) can be simple but its operations (energeia) can be many. 80 As for the operations themselves, these are not mutative movements from nonbeing into being (at least in the case of God), but are outward manifestations of inward perfections that are already fully actual. The idea here is that there is a difference, for example, between one who plays piano in order to develop that skill (moving this potency from nonbeing into being) and one who has this skill already (being) and demonstrates this perfection by playing piano (operation). In the same way, the power and perfections of the divine nature are fully actual from eternity, ad intra; the operations themselves are temporal manifestations of these perfections, ad extra. Employing this same line of reasoning, one could attempt to argue that the prayers, pleas, and other acts of the soul in the intermediate state are not mutative movements from nonbeing into being, but are operations devoid of mutation. Thus, the essential form of the soul (or, for Aquinas, which is the soul) has certain "potencies" in the sense of "operative powers" that are not "potentialities" in the prime-matter sense of "potential for mutation." 81 For my part, I have no difficulty with the idea that certain rational operations are void of mutation-all mutations are movements, but perhaps not all movements are mutations. The difficulty I have with this solution is that the created soul, and it seems angels as well, undergo successive rational changes. A significant difference between God and creatures is that God's operations, though manifest in temporal succession, do not reflect successive deliberation or discursive reasoning. Yet, creaturely operations do reflect deliberative and discursive character, and I do not see how such successive changes can avoid being labeled mutations.
Let us say, however, that we could somehow demonstrate that intellectual operations of the soul in the intermediate state, such as speech, recollection, prayer, and so on, are nonmutative operations. I do not see how the same can be said of the third aspect of Christian theology, namely, the acquisition or privation of moral perfections by the soul and by angels. As we saw 80. E.g., Basil of Caesarea, Epistola, . 81. This seems to me to be the type of thing Aquinas is getting at in De ente et essentia, section 85. in section 1 above, virtue and vice are not merely extrinsic descriptions of the overall conduct of the individual; goodness is a property that is essential to God and one that creatures may acquire or be deprived of. To use our piano analogy, the creaturely acquisition of goodness is not an outward expression of a perfection already had (like displaying my present ability to play piano), but is the acquisition of a perfection (like learning to play the piano), and is thus the movement of a potency from relative nonbeing into being. This is precisely why the patristic writers consistently identify creatures as treptos or alloiōtos, 82 and identify our moral properties as accidental.
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The accidental nature of moral properties can be demonstrated in the respective examples of Adam and Christ. Adam was created with the potential for virtue or for its neglect. Therefore, the nature human (that is, the essential properties of our species) neither entails nor excludes moral goodness. Either goodness or its lack could have been predicated of Adam without contradiction. Hence, we do not presume that Adam ceased to be human when he sinned. Conversely, we maintain that Christ took on our human nature, yet without sin, and indeed with goodness. Thus, both human and goodness are predicated of Christ. This demonstrates that the nature human is compatible with moral goodness (as per Jesus) but does not entail it (as per Adam et al.). Goodness, therefore, cannot fall under the heading of the essential properties of humanity, and thus must be accidental. In addition, the fact that Adam could have persisted in goodness and been confirmed in righteousness or move away from the good, as he in fact did, indicates that such moral properties are not only accidents but are potencies that move from nonbeing into being and vice versa. For the former movement (that is, confirmation in righteousness) would have been a movement of a perfection from relative nonbeing into being, since such confirmation is a perfection that Adam apparently never possessed, while the latter movement (that is, corruption) was in fact a retreat from the goodness had (being) back to relative nonbeing. In short, these moral movements are matters of becoming. And this very same case can be reiterated in reference to the elect and the fallen angels.
The fact that the moral properties of spirit creatures are accidental indicates that these cannot be located in the essential form of the soul or of angels, since this is the locus of the essential properties. Moreover, even when granting the distinction between the properties of a particular and the particular itself, as I do, the problem does not disappear. For moral mutations 82. E.g., Justin Martyr, Dialogi cum Tryphone judaeo, 5-6 (PG 6:485C-491A); Methodius, De creates, 3 (PG 18:336B); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 1.11 (PG 8:749C); Dionysius of Alexandria, in Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio evangelica, 7.19 (PG 21:564B); Tatian, Oratio adversus Graecos, 4; [12] [13] [14] .
83. E.g., Tatian, Oratio adversus Graecos, 4; 12 (PG 6:811-14; 829-34); Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, 4.37.2-6 (PG 7:1100-03); Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum, 1.4 (PG 6:1029a); Origen, De principiis, 1.5, esp. 1.5.5 ; Justin Martyr, Apologia secunda, 5 (PG 6:452-3); Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 2.3; 7.3; [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] do not change the specified particular from this particular to another particular-Adam remains Adam, whether corrupt or confirmed in righteousness. The mutations are within the hypostasis, but the particular's particularity is not the principle of mutation, since it remains this. Thus, in addition to the particular and the form, there must be a third principle which is the principle of potentiality and the locus of becoming. And this principle is the concept of prime matter.
Pneumatic Hylomorphism: A Confessional Defense
My confessional defense of PH will consist of both a negative assessment of the alternatives, identified in the previous section, and a positive assessment of the role that PH plays in Nicene Trinitarianism and Chalcedonian Christology. My aim is to show that confessional Christianity of the first millennium is not neutral on this or related metaphysical issues, and that the metaphysic reflected in the pro-Nicene fathers, especially in the East, not only favors PH but carries assumptions that are problematic for the alternatives.
In the previous section, we identified two alternatives to PH in Aquinas and Scotus, respectively. The former view faced the challenge of explaining how the soul, if form only, remains particular when separated from the body. We saw two possible solutions: (i) deny the separation of soul from body and affirm soul sleep or (ii) suggest that the form is a particular when individuated in the subject. Solution (i) faces the confessional hurdle that, even if one can explain in what sense the hylomorphic particular endures when the subject decomposes, the notion of a conscious intermediate state is a staple of confessional Christianity. The Church fathers, East and West, uniformly understood death as the separation of the soul from the body, and took it to be evident that the soul continues in a conscious state 84 -a belief reflected in he confession of Christ's descent into and ransacking of Hades, 85 as well as other traditions concerning the descent of the prophets, John the Baptist, and the Apostles. 86 Suffice it to say, if one has a confessional concern for what Christianity has historically professed, this hurdle is significant.
Regarding solution (ii), the confessional hurdle that the particularization of form faces is that such a notion is the very point of contention between the pro-Nicenes and the Tritheites. John Philoponus, the most well known of the Tritheites, understands natures in terms akin to gross matter, as if human were a lump of clay that has the potential to be two, three, four, and so forth, because it can be divided and placed in multiple persons. Because John thought along these lines, he presumed that Bob's humanity and Bill's humanity are numerically different. This view of the Trinity was thus deemed polytheistic because, on this reading, the divine nature is understood to be not merely common to but divided in three particulars, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 87 The result is three Gods because the nature itself is plural via individuation on this view. Contrast this with the pro-Nicenes who, when asked whether the Nicene faith professes three Gods, were emphatic that the common nature is undivided and one. Bob, Bill, and Bernice are not three humans, but are three human (singular) persons (plural). In like manner, we do not profess three Gods, or divinities (as this refers to the common nature, which is simple and one), though we do profess three divine persons. 88 Therefore, it would seem that a commitment to Nicene Trinitarianism excludes the notion of particularized form.
As for Scotus's solution, as I said, I believe this view of particularity, or something close to it, is presumed in Nicene Trinitarianism. The difficulties facing this solution concern whether haecceitas can, in itself, account for the Christian understanding of the soul and angelology. For though the Holy Trinity demonstrates that divine particulars exist without accidents and becoming, created spirits do not. And, as we will see, this fundamental difference between God and creatures plays a central role in the Nicene faith.
The first point of Nicene theology in which the metaphysics of PH plays an integral role is soteriology. In section 1, we saw that Arianism was argued to entail that the Son is mutable because, if created, his existence begins with a movement from relative nonbeing into being; thus, Arius's mutable (treptos) Son is unlike the immutable (atreptos) God who created him. This error was a central concern among Arius's opponents and the later pro-Nicenes.
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A careful consideration of the pro-Nicene writings reveals that a centerpiece of this concern is soteriological. The concern will likely be foreign to readers unfamiliar with the patristic notion of participation or deification. Space does not permit a thorough explanation of this doctrine. Suffice it to say for our purposes that the view presumes that creatures do not innately possess existence, life, or other perfections, and that the antelapsum prospect of angels and men continuing in life, being confirmed in righteousness, and attaining glory was rooted in antelapsum access to and communion with God. By partaking of the source of life, goodness, and glory, creatures could be transformed to reflect these perfections, just as metal that partakes of fire may be transformed to reflect its heating and lighting properties, while still remaining metal, of course. Yet, when moving away from the source of being (as fallen men and angels did), the only place to move, ontologically speaking, is back to nonbeing. Our only postlapsum hope of life, transformation, and glory is that God again reunite us with himself and transform us from corruption to incorruption. This is initiated in the Incarnation and affected through the believer's personal union with Christ, until culminating in the resurrection from the dead. 90 This same understanding of the salvific effect
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O'Collins (Oxford, 2004), 179-86. 89. Athanasius, Orationes tres adversus Arianos, 1.5; 1.9; 1.22; 1.28; 1.35-36; 1.48; 2.34; 4.12 (PG 26:21c; 29b; 57c; 72a; 84a-88a; 112c; 220a; 481d) It will be recalled that Athanasius suggests that it is because man is created out of nothing and moves from nonbeing into being that he may again retreat to nonbeing. 91 If being treptos, and thus being corruptible, is entailed by being created, this raises the difficulty of how one may be confirmed in righteousness and delivered from the perpetual threat of corruption. In keeping with the patristic notion of participation, Athanasius understands our hope to be to partake of God, who alone is essentially good and by nature atreptos and incorruptible. 92 The Incarnation, submits Athanasius, supplies this lifeline by uniting humanity with divinity. Yet, the Incarnation is a lifeline only if the Son of God is of the same nature (homoousia) as the Father. For only then is the Son essentially good and able to place us in communion with that nature which is alone atreptos and incorruptible. 93 Arius's Christ can do no such thing. As creature, his goodness is accidental and treptos, for he, like us, partakes of a foreign goodness, clinging to it by will. 94 This soteriological concern was not unique to Athanasius, but reflects a common understanding of one of the central soteriological effects of the Incarnation. Thus, Basil of Caesarea, when echoing Athanasius contra Arius, echoes the distinction between creatures, which are naturally corruptible, and God, who is essentially good. 95 Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa, after identifying one of Apollinarius's errors as ascribing mutability to Christ's divinity, reiterates that we can only hope to become atreptos if he who united himself with us in the Incarnation is atreptos. 96 Thus, the metaphysics of PH were not merely a philosophical aside, but were central to the soteriology of the pro-Nicenes amid the Arian dispute and later controversies. 97 The second area of Nicene theology in which the differences between God and creatures highlighted in PH is central is the doctrine of eternal generation. Rather than simply highlighting the ways in which PH illuminates this doctrine, I will set it against the backdrop of a recent attack on the doctrine from Brian Leftow. Leftow suggests that it is difficult to see how saying The Son is eternally generated by the Father is any different than saying The Son is eternally created by the Father. To illustrate his point, he offers a thought experiment in which God the Father creates, from eternity, a horde of angels. These angels are everlasting because there was no time when they were not. Moreover, he suggests that the Father creates these angels in such a way that they are morally perfect from the start. Thus, while they are causally dependent on the Father, they are nonetheless eternal and morally upright. According to Leftow, such angelic beings should be divine by Nicene standards, but this is "an unacceptably low standard of divinity." 98 I agree with Leftow that everlasting creation and moral perfection is an inadequate definition of divinity. However, this is far from what the Nicene understanding of eternal generation offers, and this fact becomes quite clear when considered the doctrine in conjunction with the metaphysics of PH. Considering Leftow's thought experiment with these metaphysics in hand, I can identify at least six points at which Leftow's thought experiment fails:
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(1) Though this may be obvious, it must be said: The most fundamental difference between Leftow's angels and the Son of God is that the former are by nature angel, while the latter is by nature God. Therefore, that which is said of God may be said of the Son, and that which is said of creatures may be said of Leftow's angels. This central failure of the analogy is the point from which all subsequent failings flow. (2) The creation of matter is an ad extra operation of God's divine energeia, whereas the generation of the Son is an ad intra generation of a second hypostasis in which the divine ousia is communicated from Father to Son. Thus, the Son, unlike creatures, is in perichoretic union with the Father.
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(3) As shown in section 1, the pro-Nicenes understand creaturely natures to be first placed in matter and then moved from relative nonbeing into being. They are thus necessarily treptos because their rem), see Maximus the Confessor's comments on the monothelite heresy in the seventh century: Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguorum liber (PG 91:1057c). 98. Leftow, "Anti-Social Trinitarianism," 210. 99. I touch on some of these deficiencies, as well as other objections to Nicene Trinitarianism from Leftow, in Jacobs, "On 'Not Three Gods'-Again," 342-6. Note that the same arguments that are here offered to explain the uniqueness of the generation of the Son apply to the uniqueness of the Holy Spirit's procession as well.
100. See, e.g., Gregory of Nazianzen, Orationes, ). See also Daniel F. Stramara, Jr., "Gregory of Nyssa's Terminology for Trinitarian Perichoresis," Vigilae Christianae 52 (1998): 257-63; Jacobs, "On 'Not Three Gods " 340. existence is initiated with a mutation. Therefore, the pro-Nicene would not grant the possibility, posited by Leftow, of a creature that is atreptos-just as they did not accept it when Arius posited it. Whatever the nature of eternal generation, it must be free of both matter and becoming. For the Son, being homoousia with the Father, is necessarily atreptos. (4) Prime matter, as the principle of becoming, is necessarily mutative, ever moving through successive mutations. Hylomorphic subjects, in which angels are included, according to PH, are necessarily temporal because they do not merely include the possibility of mutation but because they do in fact mutate in perpetuity-even if these mutations move from glory to glory. 101 The Son, being truly immaterial, does not include any becoming and is thus atemporal.
(5) Because all of creation is limited by God. Hylomorphic creatures, including angels, are circumscribed (perigraptos) and thus spatial and finite. God alone is uncircumscribed and infinite. Therefore, the Son, being God, must be uncircumscribed and infinite. (6) Unlike God, who is essentially good and is pure actuality, creatures are accidentally good and must move and be moved from potentiality into actuality. Because the ante-and post-Nicene patristic writers, especially in the East, locate moral goodness in the will (the conditions of culpability, praise, blame, and the like being knowledge of moral obligations and ability to fulfill them), 102 these writers seem closed to the idea that God might have created creatures who are already confirmed in the good. Rather, such moral accidents must be actively brought into being by the will on this metaphysic. 103 Yet, the Son, being of the same nature as the Father, is essentially and immutably good. In sum, though the precise nature of eternal generation is beyond human understanding, we can say apophatically that it is a mode of generation that is void of matter, limitation, mutation or becoming, time, and accidentssomething that simply cannot be said of creatures, according to PH. As Greg-whether the foregoing discussion would be better served by appeal to a more contemporary anthropology. 108 Perhaps more empirical (as opposed to metaphysical) models of anthropology, such as materialism or emergentism, 109 might offer a more commonsense approach to the subject. However, two very serious questions face these contemporary alternatives. The first question is In what sense are these contemporary alternatives Christian, given the argument of the previous section? The evidence presented above gives reason to think that historical Christian orthodoxy is not as metaphysically neutral as these alternative anthropologies presume. I will not develop this point any further, since the previous section has said enough. The second question, to which this final section is devoted, is In what sense do these alternatives advance the discussion? For my part, I am unconvinced that these innovations can circumvent the philosophical issues addressed above, nor do I see how these positions are better equipped to address such issues.
Rather than focusing on angelology, I will focus here on the intermediate state. The Christian belief in the resurrection raises the well-known problem of "gappy" existence for the Christian materialist. The concern here is that the end of the given subject seems to make it impossible for the subject to be resurrected. A replica of the subject can certainly be created, but such a replica would be a new subject. Peter van Inwagen explains the difficulty by way of a story in which a group of monks show him a manuscript, written by Augustine's own hand, that was burned by the Arians in AD 457. When pressing the monks how this can be the manuscript that Augustine touched if that manuscript was destroyed, their reply is that God miraculously recreated or restored it. Van Inwagen admits that he runs into a cognitive hurdle here: "I should have to tell the monks that I did not see how what they believed could possibly be true." 110 I know of two materialist solutions to this problem. The first comes from van Inwagen and Kevin Corcoran, respectively. 111 Though these views are distinct, both theories espouse some type of enduring material around which the resurrection takes place. Van Inwagen espouses that, at the death of the body, God performs a miracle by which he steals away an essential bit of human material (say, the central nervous system), necessary to preserve the enduring subject; and this stolen bit is instantly replaced with an exact copy (simulacrum) of the material taken, so that there is no empirical evidence in the corpse of the transaction. At the resurrection, the crucial bit of the body that has been preserved can be restored to life. 112 Kevin Corcoran (as well as Dean Zimmerman) takes a similar approach, espousing a theory of fissioning, according to which, at the death of the body, a transfer of material from the original body to some intermediate locale takes place, and this transference allows for the person to survive in an intermediate state until the resurrection. 113 Both approaches offer a tacit approval of the hylomorphic understanding of particularity in which identity is rooted in the enduring subject, or material particular. And the respective solutions of van Inwagen and Corcoran in many ways mirror the solution offered by Bonaventure's brand of PH. For both Bonaventure's PH and the materialist solutions of Corcoran and van Inwagen affirm that the human person is preserved by a body that is part of but less than the person prior to death, and this body departs at death until the resurrection. For Bonaventure this body is the soul (itself a subtle body), while for Corcoran and van Inwagen it is some bit of gross matter that departs for an intermediate place. Nothing new is offered by way of solution. The innovation resides in the materialist anthropology itself, and in the rather queer proposals of fissioning and simulacrums. For my part, I do not see how any anthropology that requires such measures can be considered an advance.
Might emergentism offer us something more? I do not believe so. The emergentist holds that the physical complexities of the brain give rise to higher, nonphysical mental properties, and these emergent, nonphysical properties, while dependent on and shaped by their physical ground, are not reducible to this physical ground. Rather, mind exists in bilateral relationship with body. 114 This anthropology raises, in my mind, the question of particularity addressed above in reference to Aquinas. Consciousness is a general noun. For a moderate realist, such as myself, this general noun signals a universal common to multiple particulars. If what emerges from complex physical conditions is generic consciousness, this beckons the question of particularity: How is the particularity of consciousness grounded for the emergentist? In other words, how is this my consciousness and not some singular consciousness shared by all sentient beings in whom consciousness emerges-a modern monopsychism, perhaps? The answer would seem to be its connection with a particular body of matter. In other words, because consciousness emerges out of the complexities of a particular body, the emergent property is not generic consciousness, but is a particular consciousness differentiated by accidental properties. Assuming I have this right, the solution is identical to the hylomorphic understanding of particularity in Bonaventure's PH.
Yet, here the Christian emergentist must still address the question of enduring particularity, raised above. That is, if particularity is grounded by the material that gives rise to emergent mind, how does particularity endure when the body dies? The solution, it would seem, is to embrace either soul sleep or a form of emergent dualism. 115 In the case of the former, the solution, again, is identical to the instinct of the materialists addressed above (the hylomorphic particular endures in an unconscious state). As stated, this is not new, but it is confessionally problematic. In the case of the latter, emergentism lapses into substance dualism, and is again faced with the question of the locus of particularity, accidents, and becoming raised above, especially if consciousness is separated from the material accidents that make it particular in the intermediate state. Such questions can be ignored, but they are not bypassed by emergentist anthropology.
In the end, these contemporary anthropologies are indeed new and innovative in many ways, but the solutions offered to the issues of particularity and enduring identity in no way advance the discussion beyond what is offered by older models. Moreover, to my mind they leave a gap in our understanding of angelology, since these positions display a bias toward gross matter. The only apparent benefit I see is a claim (questionable to my mind) to be more "scientific," in that these models take their cues from scientific naturalism. However, if the claim of the previous section is right, and confessional Christianity is bound by not only doctrinal but metaphysical commitments, then these innovations as innovations have chosen a de facto parting with historical Christian orthodoxy for the sake of secular respectability. To my mind, this price is simply too high to pay for very modest benefit, if they bring any benefit at all. We have seen that there are good reasons, both philosophical and confessional, to embrace PH. On the philosophical side, we have seen that medieval scholasticism raises important questions about the locus of identity, particularity, and becoming in reference to the soul; and I have argued that neither a view of spirit as pure form nor a view that adds haecceitas without matter provides sufficient means for explaining the particularity, accidents, and becoming that Christian theology professes to be present in created spirits. Instead, I have argued that these are best accounted for by PH, as argued by the Eastern fathers. On the confessional side, we have seen that PH plays a central role in pro-Nicene theology, and that this metaphysic was far from a dispensable feature of the faith but plays an important role in the pro-Nicene understanding of soteriology and the eternal generation of the Son of God. Though we do find contemporary anthropological alternatives, we have seen that these can neither avoid the philosophical and confessional issues raised here, nor do they advance the solutions beyond what we find in patristic writers and the medieval scholastics. Therefore, it seems that we have good philosophical and confessional reasons to recover pneumatic hylomorphism. 
